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This article examines the discourse of the EU’s relations with eastern Europe under the recently 
launched Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative. First, it evaluates the EaP’s conceptual framework 
to suggest that there seems to be more continuity than change in the EU’s modus operandi 
with its neighbours. More crucially, the notion of ‘partnership’, central to the new philosophy of 
cooperation with the outsiders, continues to be ill defined, causing a number of problems for the 
effective and legitimate realisation of the European Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern Partnership in 
the region. Second, drawing on the empirical investigations of the official discourses in Belarus, 
Ukraine and Moldova, the article reveals an increasing gap between EU rhetoric and east European 
expectations. In the absence of adequate partnership response to the needs and interests of ‘the 
other’, the policy is unlikely to find anticipated legitimation in the neighbourhood.
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The Eastern Partnership is a project in the making. In order to succeed this ambitious 
endeavour we must deliver lasting and visible results for the citizens of our partner countries 
and the EU1
Introduction: EU neighbourhood intentions
On 7 May 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched to strengthen the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the eastern European region.2 The new initiative fol-
lowed the European Commission’s recommendations for a ‘Strong ENP’3 and sought to 
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revamp the policy’s appeal in the area. It offered further differentiation, ownership and 
focus which were emblematically lacking in the eastern partners’ commitment to reform 
and implementation of the ENP. The EaP’s added value was unambiguously seen in the 
pursuit of a ‘more ambitious partnership between the European Union and the partner 
countries’4 to ensure the policy’s effectiveness and legitimacy in the neighbourhood.
Logistically, as posited by its founding documents,5 the EaP foresees a number of 
positive changes to ensure the eastern neighbourhood’s deeper integration into the EU. 
In particular, the policy offers a novel two-track approach by adding multilateral coop-
eration, with a regional focus on conventional bilateral relations with the EU. In order to 
develop a legal basis for cooperation, the EaP grants countries that are already in the ENP 
new concessions, while offering countries which currently lack structured relations with 
the EU (i.e. Belarus) a fast track into the framework. The policy also ambitiously outlines 
four thematic platforms of political, economic, energy security and civic reforms to be 
embedded through new Association Agreements, and a range of specific projects, which 
aim to bring the partners into ‘ever closer’ Union. It also envisions five potential flagship 
initiatives to be developed on a needs-serving basis, and through intensive engagement 
with the region’s civil society. In summary, the EaP appears timely and seemingly more 
versatile than the ENP, and it aims to amplify the latter’s effectiveness in the region.
In substantive terms, however, the EaP remains strikingly similar to the original ENP. 
There appears to be marked continuity under the EaP in both the format of engagement 
and the prioritisation of EU ownership of rhetoric and actions. More crucially and more 
surprisingly, though, for a policy explicitly intended to be a ‘more ambitious partner-
ship’, there persists the same conceptual ambiguity regarding the notion of ‘partnership’ 
that is central to the framing of the EU’s relations with its neighbours.6
Confusion arises not only in the lack of detail (after all, it is still a ‘project in the mak-
ing’), but also the lack of attention to the existing conceptual deficiencies of the original 
ENP.7 If these deficiencies are transferred to the EaP without being addressed, they 
would make the policy a priori ineffective and illegitimate in the region. In particular, 
two crucial elements are embedded in the ENP, which form the basis for a new philoso-
phy of partnership: those of joint ownership and common values. Currently they remain 
as obscure and even less pronounced than they were in the original policy. The philoso-
phy of partnership, conceptually premised on the process of ‘othering’ – construction of 
‘self’ through ‘the other’ – is included to make the EU’s approach to its neighbours more 
effective and sustainable. As the notion of partnership remains ill defined in the EU’s 
rhetoric and actions, this may have profound implications, not only for the effectiveness 
of the EaP and the legitimacy of the ENP as a whole, but, more critically, for the prospect 
of the EU becoming a ‘force for good’8 in international relations.
Thus this article addresses some conceptual and methodological discrepancies within 
the ENP/EaP by way of an empirical examination of the EU’s rhetoric and eastern 
responses to it captured through interviews with policymakers and government officials 
across the border.9 The article proceeds in two parts. The first evaluates the ENP/EaP’s 
conceptual foundations to reveal tensions within the policy, owing to the lack of an 
explicitly defined notion of partnership in the EU’s modus operandi with its neighbours. 
Notably, the article highlights some discrepancies related to (i) the increasing subversion 
and appropriation of the idea of ‘partnership’ into the EU-centred normative agenda; 
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(ii) policy fragmentation and incoherence, revealing deep horizontal and vertical 
discrepancies in the discourse of EU multifaceted foreign policymaking; and, more criti-
cally, (iii) the application of external governance as a tool of enlargement with partner 
countries who, at least in the immediate future, lack any prospect of EU membership.
The second part examines the rhetorical responses of the EU’s eastern neighbours, 
and demonstrates how the absence of ‘othering’ in the process of EU partnership-building 
with them may jeopardise the ENP/EaP’s effectiveness and legitimacy in the region, as 
well as critically inhibiting the realisation of the EU’s aspirations to become a truly trans-
formative power, a ‘credible force for good’10 in international relations.
From ENP to EaP: conceptual and methodological tensions
The notion of partnership in the ENP/EaP
The concept of partnership, in substantive terms, is a new philosophy of cooperation 
developed by the EU for framing its relations with those neighbours who lack the imme-
diate prospect of membership. This infers that this relationship is voluntary, partner-
conscious and non-binding, presuming an equal share of learning (socialising) for both 
sides in the pursuit of their norm-driven foreign policies and national interests. Although 
an essential concept for the EU’s relations with outsiders, ‘partnership’ has nevertheless 
found only limited elaboration in the EU’s discourse and practices hitherto.
The concept of partnership is not entirely new for the EU, and was initially developed in 
the mid-1990s, during the process of enlargement.11 However, at that time it was concentrat-
ing more on overcoming the emerging criticism of the EU’s unilateralism and asymmetry in 
relations with candidate countries, premised on their mandatory adoption of the acquis com-
munautaire as the basis of the accession process.12 As Tulmets13 points out, the main objec-
tives of that kind of partnership were to facilitate the deconcentration, decentralisation and 
participation of the relevant sides in order to enhance responsibility and a sense of ‘belong-
ing’ for the applicant countries in their long and non-negotiable path to the EU.
The concept of partnership gained a new rhetorical momentum with the launch of the 
ENP in 2004. Although still only circuitously articulated, it assumed a new direction in 
EU relations with outsiders (partnership as alternative to membership), and also became 
a more nuanced tool for EU foreign policy: ‘The new neighbourhood policy should not 
override the existing framework for EU relations with [third] countries … Instead, it 
should supplement and build on existing policies and arrangements.’14 This inferred that 
partnership ‘where possible’ should not replace, but complement ‘the traditional “condi-
tionality”’ applied by the EU in the process of enlargement, and should develop ‘in close 
cooperation with the partner countries themselves, in order to ensure national ownership 
and commitment’.15 There, at least on a discourse level, seems to have been an important 
conceptual shift in viewing ‘partnership’ not merely as an act of unquestionable compli-
ance in the process of transference of EU rules and norms, but, more essentially, as an act 
of negotiated compliance, thus affording some forum for discussion, and in this way 
certainly aspiring to bring ‘the other’ into the process of the EU’s construction of ‘self’ 
in international relations.16 The EU’s traditional acquis approach to third countries has 
now, at least in theory, foreseen some room for more voluntary measures and mutual 
 at Templeman Lib/The Librarian on April 14, 2014ire.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
246 International Relations 25(2)
initiatives, thus giving ‘joint ownership’ a proper place. In summary, with the launch of 
the ENP, the philosophy of partnership has clearly been given a new meaning, which by 
many standards exceeds the EU traditional unilateral approach to third countries, but 
which still falls short of approximating its true axiological value. Notably, the ENP ‘part-
nership’ rhetorically affords neighbours the right to consent to the EU’s vision of reforms, 
and also gives them the right to negotiate a pre-set body of acquis in the process of EU 
‘partnership-building’ in the neighbourhood. As the ENP practices have shown, this was 
not enough, and the framework of ‘partnership’ if it were to be effective, needed further 
concretisation and enhancement.
The EaP, envisaged as a ‘more ambitious partnership’, should have further accentu-
ated the notion of ‘partnership’, in light of the Commission’s recommendations to dif-
ferentiate and to increase ownership for partners under the ENP.17 This however, does
not seem to be the case either conceptually or methodologically. Instead partnership 
per se remains amorphous, and its constitutive elements – of ‘shared values’ and ‘joint 
ownership’ – see further rhetorical reduction in official texts. The EaP appears to concen-
trate more on extensive procedural measures to achieve its policy goals.
In the absence of a clearly defined notion of partnership, some conceptual tensions 
and discrepancies emerge, which may inhibit the effectiveness of the new policy on the 
ground. The following three are worth noting here as being more critical for the longev-
ity and effectiveness of the EaP:
1. While lacking the anchoring definition of partnership, the EU appears to increas-
ingly be privatising the elements of ‘joint ownership’ and ‘shared values’, thus 
ascribing ‘the other’ a role of compliant ‘norm-taker’ rather than a ‘negotiator’ or 
‘owner’, as initially conceived;
2. stemming from the same premise, EU policymaking towards eastern Europe 
reveals a number of critical discrepancies in EU official discourse and actions, 
primarily associated with the ambiguous interpretation of policy goals and the 
contradictory utilisation of available means by a multi-actor EU;
3. and, finally, the idea of partnership is in practice being replaced by top-down 
conditional governance, a tool of enlargement that ultimately contradicts the prin-
ciples of partnership and the EU rhetoric of engagement with non-member states.
The subversion of ‘partnership’
Although the notion of ‘partnership’ remains ill defined in ENP/EaP official documents, 
its two constitutive elements of ‘shared values’ and ‘joint ownership’ have received some 
elaboration, both in rhetoric and practice.
Rhetoric. The ENP Strategy Paper18 contains a whole section dedicated to the discussion 
of ‘shared values’. In practice, however, these are western values defined here as ‘respect 
for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights’ – in other words, the kind of ‘abstract values’ that require further contextualisation 
in order to clarify their axiomatic19 and relational value.20 Putting these epistemological 
ambiguities aside, the section clearly fails to elaborate on what exactly might constitute 
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‘shared values’ with neighbouring countries, and how these ‘shared values’, if lacking, 
should be cultivated (should they be imposed or internally gestated?). Instead, the 
Commission states that ‘in its relations with the wider world, [the EU] aims at upholding 
and promoting these values’21 – that is, the EU ‘universal values’ – thus clearly intimat-
ing the EU-centred focus of relation-building with the outside world.
In the EaP founding document, the notion of ‘shared values’ is sidelined, even substi-
tuting the notion of ‘mutual commitments to the rule of law, good governance, respect for 
human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, and the principles of market econ-
omy and sustainable development’.22 This subtle shift from ‘shared values’ to ‘mutual 
responsibilities’ is profound in its implications. It certainly adds an ethical dimension to 
the process (a sense of responsibility and moral conduct), but it also indicates the EU’s 
increasing ownership of the ‘normative’ side of ‘partnership’, requiring commitment and 
compliance from the partner states. Overall, however, the truncated definition of ‘mutual 
values’ and ‘commitments’ yet again leaves ample room for the diversity of perceptions, 
and falls short of elaborating their reciprocal nature.
‘Joint ownership’, conversely, builds on the implicit understanding of ‘shared values’ and 
interests, contending that it is not only the outcome but the actual process of partnership-
building that should be able to satisfy all parties equally:
Joint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values and common interests, 
is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners. The Action 
Plans depend, for their success, on the clear recognition of mutual interests … There can be no 
question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined 
by common consent.23
The EaP further underscores the importance of ‘joint ownership’ by adding that it ‘is 
essential, and both sides of the EaP have their responsibilities’.24 However, the conceptual 
uncertainties of ‘what’ – and more essentially ‘whose’ – values, as well as ‘how much 
reciprocity is allowed’, still remain, leaving the mechanics of partnership-building open-
ended. In practice, however, ‘shared values’ yield to the pressure of the non-negotiable 
transference of EU-centred norms and rules.
Actions. Given the considerable degree of ambiguity in the EU’s rhetoric concerning 
‘shared values’ and ‘joint ownership’, it comes as no surprise that the EU’s actions on the 
ground are fraught with contradictions and difficulties, exposing an explicit EU bias 
towards ‘ownership’ of the reform process. When analysing EU relations with the wider 
neighbourhood, many scholars critically note how ‘instrumentalist security-oriented 
dynamics’ often pervade the ideational discourse of the EU, and in fact ‘how certain 
norms have been conceived and incorporated into the [EU’s] external policy’ to reveal its 
‘security-predicated rationalism’.25 Furthermore, regional experts clearly indicate how 
‘EU norms and interests are inextricably linked’,26 and how the ‘EU seems unable to stick 
to one strategy, namely, either fostering its image as a normative power through EU–
Mediterranean relations or pursuing its political and economic interests in the region’.27
The EU appears equally confused and contradictory in its relations with its eastern 
neighbours and fails to discriminate between the EU-laden agenda and the idea of ‘joint 
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ownership’ premised on ‘shared values’. As the examination of EU official discourse 
indicates, ‘shared values’ are unequivocally EU-owned and never questioned: ‘It is about 
injecting our values into the neighbourhood’; after all, ‘it is about them aligning with us, 
rather than vice versa’.28 ‘Mutual interests’ are normally defined by the EU-predicated secu-
rity dynamic: ‘The cooperation is most effective regarding security issues because this is and 
has always been the EU’s priority.’29 Finally, ‘joint ownership’, normally realised through 
conditionality and the top-down adoption of the EU acquis, clearly equates ‘partnership’ to a 
mere act of ‘negotiated’ compliance with the EU’s pre-set body of rules and norms: ‘It will 
always be a top-down approach with EU realist interests [prevailing], but the EU will increas-
ingly come under pressure to acknowledge the horizontal character of partnership.’30
To sum up, the notion of partnership, in the absence of clearly stipulated rules of recip-
rocal engagement, becomes subverted into the unilateral modality of the EU’s vision and 
actions, thus leaving ‘the other’ out of the equation. The absence of ‘partner’ in partnership, 
however, is problematic on at least two levels: (i) it may invalidate the practical implemen-
tation of the EU’s external policies, but, more importantly, (ii) it may inhibit the develop-
ment of the EU’s image as a ‘force for good’ in the international arena, the image that 
unassailably rests on the consensus between Europe’s collective ‘self’ and ‘the others’.
Horizontal and vertical policy discrepancies
In the absence of a defined framework of partnership stipulating clear rules for reciprocal 
engagement, the policy is burdened with rhetorical and empirical inconsistencies.31 
Some scholars suggest that this discrepancy may be an unavoidable result of EU collec-
tive decision-making: ‘It may be asking too much of the EU to coordinate its multifac-
eted foreign activities given its decentralized policy-making structure.’32 Conversely, 
‘the case could be made that the importance and complexity of the relationship with 
certain ENP partners require a strategic coordination across institutions that is currently 
lacking’.33 The absence of a clear framework for equal and participatory engagement 
with neighbours results in discrepancies in both horizontal and vertical channels of EU 
policymaking, thus de-fragmenting a conceptually weak policy even further.
Horizontal discrepancy. Analysis reveals substantial critical differences in official dis-
course between the European Commission (EC), the European Parliament and member 
states’ representatives in their understanding of the EaP’s particular role and its concep-
tual foundations. In particular, the Commission perceives the EaP more ‘technically’ – 
that is, as an opportunity to progress and to ‘engage rather than to simply give aid’.34 The 
Commission does not normally differentiate between the notions of partnership and gov-
ernance;35 however, when it does, the governance approach is explicitly favoured. In all 
cases, the notion of partnership is residual, being unequivocally associated with ‘project-
ing our model into the neighbourhood’ or otherwise ‘you decide for us and you have to 
reform us’.36 Relations with neighbours are seen as determined by the EU’s own strategic 
interests (especially those of security); and partners are seen as ‘needy’ – either ‘wanting 
membership or wanting money’.37 The European parliament and the member states, in 
contrast, have a more subtle view of the relationship with neighbouring countries, taking 
a more questioning approach towards defining partnership, values and interests: ‘The 
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ENP has primarily been an attempt of governance, but in practice … was forced to accept 
more partnership elements.’38 They also seem to have been more aware of the potential 
‘cultural gap’ between ‘us and them’, and clearly consider Russia as a serious contender, 
as well as a strategic partner in the area. The perceptions of ‘the other’ nevertheless are 
similar – not as interdependent, as rhetorically claimed, but as ‘needy’: ‘They always 
want more than the EU can offer’, ‘they will never be satisfied’.39
Overall, the analysis points at certain conceptual discrepancies related to policy per-
ception and implementation. The Commission takes more of an ‘executive approach’, 
geared towards outcomes and governed by EU strategic interests. The European parlia-
ment and member states seem more cautious, especially in framing their relationship 
with Russia over the ‘contested neighbourhood’.
Vertical discrepancy. Inconsistencies in vision and action between officials in Brussels 
and their representatives in neighbouring states become more pronounced on the ground. 
Off-the-record comments by EU officials in partner states indicate a lack of ‘strong and 
consistent EU foreign policy’ conditioned by the EU’s rotating presidencies and limited 
resources. Officials show no awareness of possible tensions within the ENP’s frame-
work, clearly taking rational top-down rule transfer and conditionality for granted. They 
also reveal a clear ‘value-based’ attitude to policy implementation (‘values come first’), 
which is strikingly different from the strategic interest-based approach articulated by the 
Commission’s officials. However, their perception of partners as ‘needy and never satis-
fied’ evinces remarkable continuity with the views of Brussels. The member states’ rep-
resentatives in eastern Europe demonstrate a more nuanced understanding of partner 
countries and are explicitly concerned with Russia’s influence in the region. They seem 
to be more aware of the practical consequences of the conditionality approach, and dem-
onstrate greater value discrimination than their Commission counterparts: ‘EaP is not a 
programme of technical interests, it is values-based’, and ‘We can develop common 
values … However whether they should be imported or home grown is a big question.’40 
Furthermore, the member states’ representatives were far more critical of the EaP as a 
new initiative, describing it as ‘a policy lacking teeth’, having ‘no difference to the ENP’ 
and with ‘limited visibility on the ground’.41 They also express a better understanding of 
differences and limitations (especially of a cultural and geopolitical nature) for the EaP 
to be fully effective, but never consider them to be insurmountable.
The analysis of vertical relations has demonstrated a continuing policy incoherence. 
What was revealing was that off the record in-country officials – whether a representative 
of the Commission or of a member state – were very critical of the ENP/EaP, pointing to 
the lack of clarity and coherence, the heavy bureaucracy and a reactive (rather than pro-
spective) engagement. Overall, the observations highlight two important conclusions:
1. the conceptual gap between ‘inspirational partnership’ and ‘practical actions’ per-
sists and widens. Paradoxically there is absolutely no articulation of the problem 
by the Commission and its representatives;
2. The difference in the perceptions of ‘the other’ between EU officials in Brussels 
and those on the ground demonstrates that in order to make ‘partnership’ real, 
there should be engagement and communication with ‘the other’. This will 
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certainly facilitate the process of learning regarding partners, and of their gradual 
involvement in the EU’s construction of ‘self’ as a global player in international 
relations.
The return of governance
In the absence of a well-defined partnership, the traditional governance framework, which 
the EU has hitherto used for external action, fills the gap between EU rhetoric and actions.
Essentially, the external governance framework is an ‘inside-out’ approach whereby 
the EU effectively applies internal solutions to its external problems: for example, by 
using pre-accession methodology and enlargement conditionality for non-members who 
may never wish to join or indeed to be granted the prospect of membership. In substantive 
terms, external governance presumes a ‘selective extension of EU norms, rules and poli-
cies [to the neighbourhood] while precluding the opening of membership’.42 In the view 
of some scholars,43 the application of governance to non-member states is a perfectly 
legitimate attempt by the EU not only to ‘benevolently project’ its ‘acquired civilian vir-
tues’ to third countries – the EU’s civilising mission – but also, and more importantly, it 
is a ‘strategic attempt to gain control over policy developments’ in the neighbourhood.44 
From this perspective of perceived interdependence and the EU’s virtuous attractiveness, 
its foreign policies in the neighbourhood ‘need not ... be new’. Instead:
EU external relations may exhibit many features of ‘old governance’, including the highly 
asymmetrical relationship between insiders and outsiders; the imposition of predetermined 
formal rules; the exclusive participation of bureaucratic actors; and top-down communication 
structures45
The notion of external governance explicitly draws on a compulsory element of condi-
tionality. Its effective implementation unambiguously measures the degree of the EU’s 
engagement with partner countries, which is clearly at odds with voluntarism and equal-
ity of partnership. In the absence of a workable notion of partnership, the EU, owing to 
the perceived legitimacy of external governance,46 combined with its past effectiveness 
with candidate countries, continues to rely both conceptually and methodologically on 
the same framework when building its relations with its neighbours.
There is a plethora of governance approaches,47 but they all, in their construction of 
external engagement, place the EU at the centre of the framework. However, this gives 
the partner the right of either ‘non-negotiable’ compliance, as in the case of enlargement, 
or ‘participated/negotiated’ compliance, as in the case of neighbouring countries, with 
EU rules and norms. External governance may have been practical for the EU to promote 
its vision of global order to the candidate countries,48 but it is evidently not always recip-
rocal or sufficiently motivating for the outsiders, even if it driven by a sense of interde-
pendency. External governance is inherently one-sided and Eurocentric. Although its 
objectives – to bring stability, prosperity and security beyond the borders of the EU – are 
highly commendable, they are nevertheless unambiguously EU-owned. They are clearly 
focused on the dissemination of EU norms, rules and policies to the neighbouring coun-
tries, without the presence or prospect of ‘the other’ in the equation.49
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The empirical hold of governance over the rhetorical partnership causes a number of 
conceptual tensions. The critical limitation of governance as a sustainable framework is 
its one-dimensional modality which sees the EU’s interaction with its external environ-
ment as naturally a one-way traffic, or donor–recipient relationship,50 premised on 
extending ‘best’ practices and EU norms/values to (less civilised) third countries. This 
‘one-way’ modality is further reinforced by the ‘enlargement means’ presuming compli-
ance and allegiance rather than negotiation and alliance. What this logic fails to recog-
nise is the existence and construction of boundaries in communication with non-member 
countries. These form a two-way and mutually constitutive process, whereby the EU is 
not only an actor, but also subject to boundary construction itself – in this case under-
taken by its neighbours.51 Thus, the EU calculations that a largely non-negotiable exten-
sion of rules and norms to partner states may enhance ‘shared norms’ and ‘joint 
ownership’, is not only questionable but is clearly erroneous. Furthermore, governance 
by definition is not concerned with the boundaries of ‘the other’, and therefore becomes 
an impractical concept for evaluating issues beyond the procedural modes of interaction. 
Governance is simply unable to respond to ‘bigger’ questions like ‘Why is the ENP not 
effective?’; ‘Why does there seem to be resistance on the ground?’; and ‘Why is ENP 
legitimacy eroding?’
Furthermore, the application of governance as a substitute for partnership may lead to 
the problematic disjuncture between the EU’s rhetoric and its practical actions. In its 
rhetoric the EU pledges to pursue partnership-building relations with its neighbours. 
However, not knowing how to achieve this conceptually and methodologically, the EU 
reverts to the ‘old governance approach’, with its ‘one-size-fits-all’ philosophy of install-
ing pre-made solutions and executive practices.52 It is unsurprising that so many partner 
countries faced with the choice of either giving allegiance to the EU or otherwise facing 
exclusion find such a ‘reciprocal partnership’ uneasy and often intrusive.53 This kind of 
engagement is evidently devoid of a true understanding of partners’ own boundaries 
(values/interests), especially those of culture and geopolitics.
Finally, methodological tensions between inspirational partnership and empirical gov-
ernance may affect the process of EU construction of ‘self’ as a ‘force for good’. As Diez 
observes, a notion such as a ‘normative power Europe’, which the EU clearly aspires to, 
is not at all an objective category, but rather ‘a practice of discursive representation’,54 
which involves construction of ‘self’ through the other. ‘The other’ can take different 
forms – from being seen as inferior, existential or a direct threat to simply as being 
different – but invariably it will have an impact on the process of the EU’s construction 
of ‘self’. Being seen as ‘different’ is perhaps ‘preferable to the other three in that it reduces 
the possibility to legitimise harmful interference with the other’.55 In external governance 
the process of ‘othering’ is circumvented: it is either removed entirely from EU external 
actions by simply concentrating on the promotion of the EU as an attractive model, or it 
is limited to treating ‘the other’ as a threat or inferior, thus securitising EU relations with 
outsiders. In either case, the EU behaves less as a normative actor and more as a civilis-
ing/securitising actor56 in an attempt to make its neighbours – ‘the objects of governance’ 
– like Europe, to ensure access and control. This path to becoming a ‘force for good’, 
however, is a priori erroneous: it works for the EU’s interests of security and stability, but 
it excludes ‘the other’ from their representation in the EU identity.
 at Templeman Lib/The Librarian on April 14, 2014ire.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
252 International Relations 25(2)
The following section explores partners’ ‘discursive responses’ to the ill-defined 
framework of partnership under the ENP/EaP to argue that ‘the other’ should be given 
better representation and brought back into the equation for the purpose of building sus-
tainable reciprocal relations with a wider Europe.
Eastern European response: the missing ‘other’
The discourse of discrepancies and misinterpretations continues at the partners’ level in 
response to the uncertainties of ‘partnership’-building with the EU. It is known that the 
EaP has not received a welcome in neighbouring countries. Both Ukraine and Moldova 
clearly perceive the policy as derogatory or, in the words of some Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) officials, a ‘direct insult’ to them, not least for throwing all six EaP part-
ners into one basket regardless of their experience or aspirations. Belarus, an all but 
impossible ‘partner’ to the EU,57 seems to be the only exception in the region: it has wel-
comed its inclusion in the multilateral element of partnership, but, unsurprisingly, is 
already sabotaging many of the EU’s concessions in search of a better accommodation of 
its national needs and interests.58 Brussels is taking a very long time to convince partner 
countries of the legitimacy and the potential usefulness of the new initiative. Some nego-
tiations have been more successful than others, owing to the critical economic state of 
partner countries. However, the prospects for a ‘more ambitious’ and inclusive partner-
ship remains equivocal. In the following section, I will explore the discourse of the EU 
and national officials on the degree of their convergence and understanding of the part-
nership-building process.
Belarus: towards legitimation of the ENP?
The dissonance of opinions between EU officials, member state representatives and the 
Belarus officials is striking. The EU delegation is the only in-country actor that views with 
any optimism the EaP’s potential to influence Belarus , the only country which presently 
does not have any structured relations with the EU, thus in a way delegitimising the ENP’s 
conceptual foundations in the region. The introduction of the EaP is perceived by EU 
officials to be a tailor-made opportunity for an outlier like Belarus to develop legal ties 
with the EU to ensure the latter’s access and control. Relations are clearly interest-driven, 
technical, and mostly apolitical, with only infrequent reference to the EU’s political 
acquis. One of the principal concerns of EU officials is the lack of unity in the positions 
on Belarus within EU institutions, which impedes the progress of decision-making, and, 
more critically, may ‘lose positive but fragile momentum in EU–Belarus relations’.59 An 
obvious disjuncture is the issue of ‘shared values’ and ‘shared interests’. Although there is 
an implicit recognition of the mutual-interest approach, and an understanding that ‘values 
should not be imported, but developed’,60 the Commission, in order to avoid accusations 
of double standards, occasionally slips into the dogmatic and ineffective insistence that 
Belarus implements the EU’s twelve principles and its political acquis.61 This is further 
compromised by the EC’s denial of ‘unique Slavic values’, which, as viewed by Belarusians 
themselves, is what makes them different and resilient to ‘alien’ western influence, and 
which should be better understood by the EU if cooperation is to continue.62
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It is interesting to note that, in opposition to the Commission’s officials, member 
states’ representatives take a far more cautious and ambiguous approach to Belarus. All 
interviewees point to the importance of partnership over governance, but also accept that 
the ‘acquis is the EU’s intrinsic tool’, and may be hard to alter. All agree that Belarus 
must not be pressured, insisting that ‘we must first understand how the partner works’.63 
Discrepancies in opinions emerge yet again on the issue of ‘shared values’ versus ‘mutual 
interests’, revealing a deep clash of visions and solutions. There is a clear rift between 
the new and old member states, with the former emphasising the salience of values (‘we 
cannot betray our values’; ‘EaP is not a programme of technical interests, it is values-
based’), and with the latter underscoring the effectiveness of short-term tactics over a 
more principled approach (‘interests are long-term values’). The other difference relates 
to member states’ acute awareness of the strong presence of Russia, and the need to treat 
Belarus ‘not as a bridge to Russia’, but as an independent entity. This has been dismissed 
by Commission officials as a nuisance, in light of their perception of the EaP as a ‘win–
win’ situation for all parties concerned.64
Finally, Belarusian officials see the EaP as a pragmatic step towards dialogue with 
the EU; however, if the EaP is ‘about imposing alien values’, it is likely to fail.65 
Furthermore, Belarus clearly perceives itself to be an equal partner with Europe, and 
is ready ‘to negotiate as equals to reach common ground’. However, criticism is 
already mounting to suggest that the EU chooses partners to its liking, ‘whereas we are 
different and conscious of our national interests, and the EU finds it difficult to swal-
low’.66 Also, ‘even with the stretch of imagination, our relations are not yet of equals: 
The EU has many demands and conditions and is still driven by a lot of stereotypes, 
which is not a promising start for our effective cooperation.’67 In the view of Belarus 
there are a lot of internal boundaries that currently prevent the development of effec-
tive apolitical cooperation with the EU, including organisational ones (obsolete 
bureaucracy and a defensive legal system); financial ones (insufficient resources) and 
personnel problems (lack of adequately trained specialists). The main obstacle, how-
ever, remains ideological: ‘if the EU comes here to teach us how to live, this would 
give the wrong footing for cooperation’.68 Opinions about the role of Russia in Belarus’ 
relations with the EU have markedly diverged, reflecting the current political indeci-
siveness towards their traditional eastern ally: some interviewees suggest that Belarus 
should be treated independently (and not as a bridge, or the window between two civi-
lisations); others insisted that Belarus should ‘come to Europe’ with Russia (‘we are 
too interdependent to be apart’).69 In either case, the sensitivity of being part of
the ‘contested neighbourhood’ is high, and is presently underacknowledged by EU 
officials. As far as ‘shared values’ are concerned, Belarusian officials remain prag-
matic and adamant: ‘partnership in politics should be premised on interests ... Joint 
interests and long track record of cooperation may generate common values, norms 
and understanding.’70
To conclude, when triangulating the discourses of Commission officials, member 
states representatives and Belarusian authorities, the picture of engagement becomes 
rather fragmented. However, two important corollaries prevail: all sides realise that the 
only way forward is through the partnership of mutual interests and the acceptance of 
‘the other’ as different, but not as a ‘threat’ or ‘inferior’.
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Ukraine: a deadlock of ambitions?
A similar narrative of discrepancies and misconceptions is observed in Ukraine, this 
time, however, with a far deeper gulf between EU capabilities and Ukrainian expecta-
tions. If not addressed, these could have extensive consequences for the region.
Contrary to its other representations in the region, off-the-record comments by the EU 
delegation in Kiev were very sceptical regarding the added value of the new initiative and 
critical of the Brussels bureaucracy, especially when it comes to the daily management of 
EU–Ukrainian flagship relations. One of the few advantages the delegation’s officials see 
for Ukraine under the EaP is the development of its regional leadership as part of the 
multilateral dimension, presented to the partners as a fait accompli. The multilateral 
dimension is clearly seen by Brussels as an opportunity for the region to unite under the 
banner of the ENP, and in this way break away from Russia. This decision, however, has 
found little support either amongst the member states or national officials (see below). 
Furthermore, although in rhetoric EU–Ukraine relations are generally seen as those of 
equals based on shared principles, in reality off-the-record comments from the delega-
tion’s officials have indicated that ‘equal partnership’ could only emerge with a member-
ship perspective. The EC officials also explicitly entertained a ‘principled’ rather than 
interest-based approach towards building cooperation, which is at odds with the EC’s 
hard bargaining especially on energy and immigration issues: ‘Norms and interests can be 
reconciled, whereas values not, therefore for real partnership – values are the key.’71
Member states display a divergent attitude to Ukraine. They clearly view the country 
as an equal and important partner for Europe, ‘who in fact should be in Europe’.72 They 
also convey more doubts about the success of the EaP, especially in Ukraine, suggesting 
that ‘Ukraine either will take it or bury it’.73 As with their counterparts in Belarus, they 
see limitations to effective cooperation in Ukraine’s domestic politics and with Russia. 
Discrepancies emerge on ‘shared values’. Although ostensibly agreeing that Ukraine had 
now become a European country, with a clear European ethos, respondents also indicate 
some conspicuous (and possibly irreconcilable) differences in culture and traditions 
which remain quintessentially Soviet.
Ukrainian officials, however, explicitly expressed their dissatisfaction with the EaP: 
‘the ENP was conceptually unsuited for Ukraine, and the EaP repeats the story’.74 
According to Ukrainian officials, the EaP offers ‘no sense of direction’, ‘no coordina-
tion’, ‘no adequate resources’ and, more importantly, no awareness of ‘how to achieve 
the posited aims’.75 Furthermore, they were also critical of the EU–Ukrainian relations 
of partnership: ‘There is no partnership, the idea of joint ownership is not working’; ‘We 
are not equal by definition, or at least that is what we are led to believe’; ‘The EU does 
not want to see Ukraine as an equal partner. We have no trust and no concrete objectives. 
If we had a prospect of membership, we would have allowed the EU to dictate.’76
In opposition to the EU’s vision, national officials contend that ‘relations should be 
based on common rules, not values, which would make cooperation far more effec-
tive’.77 Furthermore, the interest-based relationship should be of equals, and this is what 
Ukraine has finally come to realise: ‘We initially had a sense of inferiority, now we have 
become more pragmatic.’78 Russia has been named as one of the potential obstacles that 
may impede EU–Ukrainian relations. Ukraine acutely feels the potentially ‘divisive’ 
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politics of its greater neighbours, which the EU currently refuses to admit: ‘Russia is a 
key player: we should balance our security interests, and work with Russia more.’79
In conclusion, on triangulation of EU and Ukrainian official discourses, it emerges 
that no party is optimistic about the EaP’s success in the country. All comment that it 
lacks vision, direction and resources. Discrepancies are especially felt on the issues of 
partnership and values. A growing sense of disillusionment in the EU has permeated the 
official Ukrainian discourse, giving rise to a novel phenomenon, Euroscepticism,80 in a 
previously Euro-enthusiastic country.
Moldova: a showground for success?
Although revealing similar misgivings to its neighbours, Moldova nevertheless stands 
out in the region as a country ready to comply with EU requirements.81 EU officials in 
turn seem to appreciate Moldova’s new government commitment but fear the potential 
outcome of such enthusiastic engagement.
The EU delegation’s officials assess the potential of the EaP positively, as ‘a “more” 
approach: more money, more focus, more assistance and opportunities’.82 However, they 
show no awareness of partnership/governance tensions, and explicitly accept that there 
can be no equal relations with Moldova given the size and the superiority of the EU. 
Discrepancies emerge on the issue of ‘shared values’. Although it is agreed that Moldova 
is more European than some EU countries, there is no understanding of real European 
values at a mass level.
Member states, yet again, seem to contradict the Commission’s view. They believe 
that although the EaP may indeed be in theory ‘best-tailored’ for Moldova, in practice it 
‘lacks teeth’ and has ‘no visibility on the ground’. The vision of partnership, however, is 
the same: it is ‘either you take it or leave it’, and Moldova seems to be wanting ‘to take 
it’, and even to ‘be guided through’.83 All interviewees acknowledged Russia as serious 
player in the region, which will not allow easy solutions for the Transdniestrian conflict 
on the Moldovan border.84
Finally, Moldovan officials see the EaP as a policy of ‘abstract phrases and no com-
mitment’: ‘If it is not clear “where we go”, then “how we can get there” is problematic. 
Also it offers limited advice, financial assistance and empty promises. We are simply 
losing time;85 ‘EaP is an odd attempt to show, bureaucratically, that something is being 
done without any specific purpose’;86 ‘It is a rather shallow policy, but time will show. 
For now, we simply need to accept what is offered given the circumstances.’87
The question of partnership in Moldova has been dismissed as irrelevant, as ‘it is clear 
that the EU governs here’, even suggesting that ‘the EU is too soft and needs to be more 
concrete and critical’.88 Moldovan officials explicitly point out that the EU has limited 
knowledge of local situations and that its policies in the region were divisive. They stated 
that ‘Russia is not a hindrance; [the] internal situation is a problem. We need to bring 
Russia into the equation too.’89 There was also a clear gap in common values, which are 
conditioned by the Soviet past: ‘We repeat phrases and create illusions of values, without 
their real understanding.’90
On triangulation of discourses it emerges that although Moldova is favoured as a 
small and cooperative partner, which with the right attitude could achieve great success, 
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there is also an acute awareness, in both Moldova and the EU, of the EU’s excessive 
bureaucratisation, sluggishness (especially at a time of crisis) and reactive engagement. 
This leaves a gap between the expectations on the ground and the capacity to deliver at 
the top. In addition, the Russian factor, as elsewhere in the neighbourhood, will continue 
to play a decisive role in steering Moldova towards European integration.
Conclusion: An adequate tool for the neighbours?
The Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009 to address the limitations of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, including its poor differentiation and legitimation in the eastern 
European region. Rhetorically it aimed to shift the focus away from its own agenda and 
to offer a more discriminating approach to the EU’s eastern neighbours. So far, however, 
the EU has struggled to accomplish this in practice.
With the launch of the EaP, the EU clearly intended to provide a whole gamut of new 
tools, instruments and structural opportunities in an attempt to further incentivise the front-
runners (Ukraine and Moldova), and to engage those who initially rejected or struggled 
with the policy (Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan). Furthermore, a new emphasis on 
regional cooperation between the neighbouring countries themselves was added to increase 
cohesion and policy effectiveness in the area. Despite all these efforts, the article has argued, 
the EU is nevertheless likely to fail to legitimately increase its presence in the region, due 
to considerable conceptual limitations of the policy, partly inherited from the ENP.
This article has opened up a discussion of the new policy’s deficiencies, especially 
concerning the ill-defined notion of ‘partnership’ as the focal point of the initiative. It has 
demonstrated that partnership cannot exist without the sufficient presence of ‘the other’ 
in the equation, to adequately gauge ‘joint interests’ and gestate ‘shared values’ – the 
ENP/EaP’s core constitutive elements – in the pursuit of a mutually beneficial and secure 
future. If the rhetoric of partnership is not realised, the discourse of discrepancies between 
the neighbours’ expectations and the EU’s own actions will lead to the policy’s lack of 
efficiency and its further delegitimation in the region.
It has been observed that despite a number of procedural novelties and the EaP’s dif-
ferentiated regional focus, the conceptual continuity between the ENP and the EaP per-
sists, thus prejudicing the policy from the outset. This is expressed in the EU’s avoidance 
of a clear definition of the partnership framework for the outsiders, which causes a 
number of tensions:
1. In the absence of a workable concept of partnership, there is a tendency within 
the EU to appropriate the notions of ‘values’ and ‘joint ownership’ – two consti-
tutive elements of partnership-building – and substitute them with EU-centric 
rhetoric and means.
2. In the absence of clearly defined notions of ‘values’ and ‘means’, the policy is 
permeated with inconsistencies and horizontal/vertical discrepancies, thus inhib-
iting the implementation of the policy on the ground. This has been further exac-
erbated by institutional restructuring within the EU under the Lisbon Treaty, 
leaving key decision-making ambiguous and ill defined.
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3. In the absence of partnership as an instrument for cooperation, external govern-
ance, a successful tool of enlargement, has filled the gap between EU rhetoric and 
actions; however, this has proven to be an illegitimate and unproductive tool for 
the EU’s closer cooperation with neighbouring countries.
4. Eastern European responses recognise inconsistencies within the new policy, and 
reveal limited commitment and opportunism, which to some degree have been 
caused by the EU itself.
The notion of partnership has far more at stake than is currently understood. It is not 
simply about making the policy more effective. It is about the EU’s aspirations to become 
a ‘credible force for good’91 for the neighbourhood (and the world) that will be ques-
tioned by the outsiders, and this is something the EU cannot afford to disregard.
The EU’s current behaviour as an aspiring global transformative force, with the ambi-
tion to ‘shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’,92 reveals a strong mix-
ture of conflicting interests, ideas and norms. These are generated by the EU’s heterogeneous 
multi-actor institutional landscape, and often critical unawareness and lack of reflection in 
making the distinction between ‘the promotion of universal norms’ and the ‘projection of 
its own understanding of norms to the rest of the world’.93 Such contradictory practices and 
the increasing gap between its rhetoric and its action deliver ambiguity to those aspiring to 
EU norms, thus risking accusations of double standards and a lack of legitimacy by the 
outsiders. More crucially, however, the lack of critical awareness of its own transformative 
force (of what it is and how to achieve it) clearly inhibits the development of a progressive 
image of Europe as a global ‘force for good’, residing in the consensus between the EU’s 
collective ‘self’ as a multifaceted actor and ‘the others’. Without the knowledge of its trans-
formative force, and especially its shortcomings, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for 
the EU to identify an effective and measurable path for becoming a legitimate and credible 
‘force for good’ in the international arena.
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